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"THE LOSS IN MY BONES":
PROTECTING AFRICAN AMERICAN HEIRS' PROPERTY
WITH THE PUBLIC USE DOCTRINE
April B. Chandler*
INTRODUCTION
The Spanish moss swayed gently in the ancient live oaks, and the pungent smell
of the salt marsh rolled in with the tide as Johnny Rivers sat on the steps of his home,
reminiscing. "'Never wanted to be anywhere else .... I thought I would die here,""
he says of the land he lived on for sixty-nine years. Patriarch of a family of twenty-
seven children, grandchildren, and great-grandchildren, Johnny Rivers was born on
this seventeen acre tract on Clouter Creek near the Cainhoy Peninsula of Charleston,
South Carolina.2 His father, Hector Rivers, son of a former slave, acquired the land
in 1888, and Rivers family members have been born, reared, and buried on it ever
since.' Unfortunately, despite never having missed a tax payment, on September 27,
2001, twenty-five members of the Rivers family were evicted in the largest eviction
carried out by the Berkeley County Sheriffs Department in at least the last nine
years.4 The court ordered the Rivers family to accept an offer of $910,000 from an
investor who then put the land back on the market eight months later for three million
dollars.5 Had the judge permitted the Rivers family to sell on the open market rather
than convey their land to the only buyer who ever had the opportunity to make an
offer, perhaps Hector Rivers's heirs could have reaped the full value of their land.6
Johnny Rivers, who shared title to the land with more than thirty family
members scattered as far as New York, Florida, and Georgia,7 could officially claim
* B.A., College of Charleston, 1999; J.D., William & Mary School of Law, 2006. The
author would like to thank the editorial board of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal
for their assistance and encouragement.
1 Tony Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle Leads to Loss of Land, POST & COURIER
(Charleston, S.C.), Dec. 24, 2000, at Al [hereinafter Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle].
2 Id.
3 Id.; Tony Bartelme, Families EvictedFrom Heirs'Property; Deputies Enforce Court's
Directive After Relative's Lawsuit Leads to Sale Order, POST& COURIER (Charleston, S.C.),
Sept. 28, 2001, at B 1 [hereinafter Bartelme, Families Evicted].
4 Id.
5 Tony Bartelme, Heirs Land at Risk, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), June 23,
2002, at B 1 [hereinafter Bartelme, Heirs Land].
6 Id.
7 Tony Bartelme, FatherDreads Family's Eviction In Heirs'Property Dispute, POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C), Sept. 27, 2001, at Al.
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only 3.515 percent of the proceeds after attorneys' fees.' "'I feel the loss in my
bones,"' 9 he said. "'I feel like part of my body is gone, but I'm still living.""
Today, that seventeen acre tract has been subdivided into "Pinefield Plantation.""
A recent search of properties for sale in the new subdivision turned up a five
thousand square foot mansion on a .3 acre lot with a deep water dock selling for 2.5
million dollars. 2 A second property included a .29 acre tract, a 4,900 square foot
house, and a deep water dock available for just over two million dollars. 3
Johnny Rivers's story is being repeated all over the South.' 4 "In Berkeley
County[, South Carolina,] alone, more than 1,300 properties involving more than
17,000 acres are listed on tax rolls as belonging to the 'heirs of..."'"5 Because he
shared title to the land with family members scattered across the country, many of
whom had never even seen the land, Johnny Rivers had no legal recourse when
some of those family members decided to sell the property. Under the current
property law system, families who have lived on the same land for generations have
little protection when developers wish to take advantage of their fractured,
problematic titles by purchasing an interest in the land at below market value. 6 In
order to ensure that these families receive a fair price for their land if they are forced
to sell, the statutory system should be revised.
James Madison stated: "Government is instituted to protect property of every
sort .... This being the end of government, that alone is a just government, which
impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own."' 7 Thousands of African
American farmers in the Southeast lack record title to their land and are unable to
enjoy fully the benefits of land ownership. 8 Although the families have lived on the
land for generations and pay the property taxes, they risk losing their property to
developers who can afford to buy them out at court-ordered auctions. As the price
of desirable coastal property has skyrocketed over the last decade, developers have
become adept at finding fractured titles, purchasing a family member's interest in
8 Bartelme, Heirs Land, supra note 5. See infra Part II for a discussion of intestate
succession.
9 Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle, supra note 1.
'0 Id.
1 Real estate flyers on file with author.
12 Id.
13 Id.
"4 David J. Dietrich & Julius J. Zschau, Preliminary Report of the Property Preservation
Task Force, 2004 A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. L. 7.
15 Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle, supra note 1.
16 HEIRS' PROPERTY PRESERVATION PROJECT, HEIRS' PROPERTY 2 (2002), available at
http://www.sccej.org/bookv4.pdf [hereinafter HEIRS' PROPERTY].
17 James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 1 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 598 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
18 Bartelme, Heirs' Property Tangle, supra note 1.
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the land for a small price, and going into court to force division of the land.' 9
Because it is impracticable to divide the land physically among the many title
holders, courts most often order a partition sale - usually an auction - and the
land is sold to the highest bidder, generally at below-market value.20 The auctions
are private affairs; usually, only the developer and the family bid on the land, and
the family who cannot afford to outbid a large development company is forced to
leave the land of its forefathers for pennies on the dollar.2'
This alarming trend threatens more and more African American landowners in
the Southeast. Historically, poor, rural landowners, especially African Americans,
were reluctant to write wills, and land traditionally passed to family members
through the laws of intestacy.22 In the last century, African Americans have lost
nearly thirteen million acres of farmland in the United States.23 According to the
2002 Census of Agriculture conducted by the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), African American farmers owned 2,196,264 acres of farmland
in the United States and rented or leased 1,159,527 acres.24 By comparison, white
farmers owned 534,480,132 acres and rented or leased another 345,513,400 acres.25
African Americans are the principal operators on only 1.36 percent of all the farms
in the United States.26 From 1920 to 1978, the number of farms operated by African
Americans in the United States declined at a rate of 93.8 percent compared with a
56.4 percent rate for white farm operators. 27 The rapid loss of African American-
'" See generally Todd Lewan & Dolores Barclay, Torn From the Land: Black Families
Lose Land Through Legal Maneuvering, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 9, 2001, at Al.
20 Id.
2' For a fascinating series that examines African American land loss over the last 150
years due to this type of auction as well as other, more violent land loss, see Todd Lewan and
Dolores Barclay, Torn From the Land, Associated Press, Dec. 2,2001. This three-part series
includes the personal stories of many families across the Southeast and was the result of an
eighteen-month investigation that included interviews with more than one thousand people
and examination of tens of thousands of public records.
22 Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of
Tenancies in Common, 95 NW. U. L. REv. 505, 518-19 (2001).
23 See generally Lewan & Barclay, supra note 19; HEIRS' PROPERTY, supra note 16.
24 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., 2002 CENSUS OF AGRIC. SELECTED
FARM CHARACTERISTICS BY RACE OF PRINCIPAL OPERATOR, available at http://www.nass.
usda.gov/census/census02/operatorsbyrace/opbyrace.txt. According to the census, which is
taken every five years and represents the most accurate data available for farm ownership
and operation, in 2002 there were 29,090 farms in the United States where the principal
operator was African American and 2,067,379 farms where the principal operator was white.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id As of 2002, 2,129,082 farms were in operation in the United States. Id.
27 John G. Casagrande, Jr., Acquiring Property Through Forced Partitioning Sales:
Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 756 (1986).
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owned farmland can be traced to several factors; however, this Note will focus on
land lost through forced partition sales.
Part I of this Note traces the history of African American land ownership in the
South, its dramatic rise during Reconstruction, and its subsequent fall after 1910.
It notes several historical reasons for the land loss, including difficulty in receiving
fair loans, natural disasters, the Great Migration, and racism. Part I also charts
current landownership among African American farmers and the threats those
landowners face today. In 1999, a major class action lawsuit against the federal
government resulted in more than 13,000 African American farmers receiving
compensation for discriminatory lending practices by the USDA.28 Unfortunately,
this settlement was "too little, too late" for many of the farmers who were forced to
sell their land because they could not obtain loans from the USDA or because the
USDA foreclosed on their farms after discriminating against them during the loan
process. Further, even after paying out over eight hundred million dollars, the USDA
has not revised any of its policies.29
Part II of this Note defines and explains the problem of heirs' property- land
passed intestate through several generations such that the owners and interests
become varied and scattered. Usually, such land is at risk to family turmoil and to
developers who seek out the land specifically because it lacks protection. Part II
estimates the number of title holders affected by heirs' property and explains how
the rules of tenancy in common operate to put heirs' property title holders at extreme
risk to developers.
Developers may purchase a small interest in the land from one family member
and petition the court for a partition sale." Despite a stated preference for partition
in kind expressed in most states' partition statutes, the majority ofjudges accept the
plea for a partition sale.3 Usually, these sales are auctions, and the only two parties
present are the developer and the family. Unless the family can outbid the developer,
its land is sold, generally at well below market value. By accepting the partition sale,
judges place the burden on the defendant family members to prove that partition in
kind is an economically worthwhile undertaking. Because the partition statutes
express a preference for partition in kind, courts should be required to shift that
burden onto the plaintiffs to prove that physical partition is impossible, substantially
impracticable, or would significantly devalue the land.
28 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82 (D.D.C. 1999).
29 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 528-29.
30 This paragraph is a generalized description of a process used by many developers to
acquire valuable heirs' property at rock-bottom prices. While the actual details of any
family's experience may vary, newspaper reporters are finding remarkably similar stories all
over the South. This is exemplified in the Bartelme series. See supra notes 1, 3, 5, 7; see also
Lewan and Barclay, supra note 21.
"' See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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Part III of this Note explains the power of eminent domain and examines the
Supreme Court's development of takings power. The Court has distinguished
between regulatory takings and physical exactions of property that require just
compensation.32 If a regulatory taking does not destroy all economically viable use
of the land, and the state's regulation can be justified, the Court will uphold such
takings as legitimate uses of the state's eminent domain power, and the state does
not need to pay owners for the loss of their property.33 Thus, a regulatory taking
imposing restrictions on the ability of heirs' property owners to sell or to partition
their land should withstand the rational-basis scrutiny of the Court.
Part IV of this Note traces the Supreme Court's Public Use Clause jurispru-
dence. Although the clause was originally intended to protect against government
taking private property except in specific, limited circumstances, the Supreme Court
has extended the Public Use Clause to protect against social injustice34 as well as to
cover situations where the only public benefit is a purely economic one.35 This
section analyzes the development of the jurisprudence from a narrow view to a
broad view that permits courts to defer to a legislature's stated purpose. It then
applies the Takings Clause to a proposed statutory reform to protect heirs' property.
Imposing statutory restrictions on the ability of heirs' property owners to sell their
portion of the land would be a regulatory taking; however, such restrictions can be
justified as protecting a rapidly dwindling cultural resource. Therefore, an "external
judicial check"'36 of any restrictions imposed on heirs' property to protect it from devel-
opers would likely find that protection of the property's existing use is necessary to
forestall the harm that threatens to arise from the current lack of protection of this
land.
This Note proposes that heirs' property advocates work with existing case law to
argue for protection of heirs' property in order to prevent families from having to sell
their property at below market value. Shifting the burden of proof onto developers to
prove that partition in kind is impossible would help protect the families who live on
the land. Even if the majority of the land was sold, those who wish to keep the land
in their family would have a better chance of retaining their portion. Although, to this
point, developers have used regulatory takings to their advantage by inducing the
government to condemn private land under a public use guise, the same precedent can
be used by heirs' property advocates. The public need for preserving this land as a
valuable cultural and historical treasure can easily be justified under the current public
purpose doctrine. Because the courts are so deferential to the state's justification,
32 See infra Part Il.
33 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
34 See, e.g., Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
31 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
36 Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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regulations that provide greater protection to heirs' property owners would surely
survive rational basis scrutiny.
I. HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LAND OWNERSHIP IN THE SOUTH
After the Civil War, the four million newly freed slaves who hoped to attain land
ownership for themselves soon saw their hopes dashed. With no savings or income,
the freedmen were unable to buy land, even with the dramatic drop in land prices that
accompanied Reconstruction." General Sherman's field order Number Fifteen deeded
millions of acres of land from Georgia to the South Carolina Sea Islands to freed
slaves,3" and in 1865, Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and
Abandoned Lands to open up forty-six million acres of land in Alabama, Arkansas,
Florida, Louisiana, and Mississippi to homesteaders.39 Although the Freedmen's
Bureau specified that applicants could not be discriminated against on the basis of
race, the vast majority of this land ended up in white hands.' Many former slaves
turned to sharecropping, a system that shared with slavery similar patterns of control
31 UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIViL RIGHTS, THE DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN
AMERICA 14 (1982) [hereinafter DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN AMERICA].
38 Homecoming... Sometimes IAm Haunted By Memories of Red Dirt and Clay (PBS
television broadcast Feb. 3, 2000). A transcript of the film is available at http://www.news
reel.org/transcripts/homecomi.htm.
39 Michael L. Lanza, "One of the Most Appreciated Labors of the Bureau": The
Freedmen's Bureau and the Southern Homestead Act, in THE FREEDMEN'S BUREAU AND
RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS 67, 67 (Paul A. Cimbala & Randall M. Miller eds.,
1999).
40 Homecoming... Sometimes IAm Haunted By Memories ofRed Dirt and Clay, supra
note 38.
General we want Homesteads; we were promised Homesteads by the
government;... [W]e are left in a more unpleasant condition than our
former .... You will see this Is not the condition of really freemen.
You ask us to forgive the land owners of our land. You only lost your
right arm. In war and might forgive them. The man who tied me to a
tree & gave me 39 lashes & who stripped and flogged my mother & my
sister &... who combines with others to keep away land from me well
knowing I would not Have any thing to do with him if I had land of my
own - that man, I cannot well forgive. Does it look as if He Has
forgiven me, seeing How He tries to keep me In a Condition of
Helplessness[?]
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Letter from Henry Bram et. al, Committee of Freedmen
on Edisto Island, South Carolina, to Major General Oliver Otis Howard, Commissioner,
Freedmen's Bureau (Oct. 20 or 21, 1865)). See also Thomas C. Holt, "To Make the World
Anew ": The Black Role in Reconstruction, Center for the Study of the American South, at
http://www.unc.edu/depts/csas/Conferences/remembering%20reconstruction%2holt.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2005) (quoting the entire letter).
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and dominance.4 Those who were able to purchase land generally could afford
fewer acres and less fertile soil than their white counterparts. Banks refused to lend
to African American farmers who were then forced to borrow from local merchants
at high interest rates.42 Those merchants extended financing only for cotton, "a safe
cash crop that would have a ready market in the event of foreclosure." ' 3 The
farmers were thereby prevented from engaging in crop rotation and could not obtain
financing from their lenders for fertilizers to replenish their nutrient-deprived soil."
Cotton prices rose dramatically in the early 1900s, however, and the creation of
African American farming colleges and lending institutions improved the literacy
rate, range of farming skills, and ability to engage in self-determination for these
small farmers.45 By 1910, African American farm ownership peaked at fifteen million
acres.' These new landowners "saw the possession of land as a symbol of a new
beginning, a new independence." ' 7 This positive turn in fortune did not last long.
With the advent of World War I in 1914, the price of cotton plummeted as
Europe ceased its transatlantic trading.48 While banks extended credit to white
farmers during this time, many African American farmers were forced "to sell their
land for a fraction of its value." '  More devastating yet, the boll weevil spread
north from Mexico, across Texas, and east through Alabama, Georgia, and the
Carolinas.50 By 1921, the boll weevil had ravaged the entire South, and cotton yield
was in many instances cut nearly in half.5' The establishment of Jim Crow
41 DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN AMERICA, supra note 37, at 17. For a description of
the hardships of sharecropping, see Homecoming... Sometimes 1Am Haunted By Memories
of Red Dirt and Clay, supra note 38.
I was sharecropping 'fore [the Great Depression], and I had
sharecropped about 3 or 4 years. That means working with the white
man. It was rough, from sun up to sun down, men making $.40 women
making $.30, $2.20 for five and a half days at $.40 a day. Folks furnish
the houses and everything we was living in and you have to do just like
they said do because they was, we was working for them, you know.
They couldn't treat a dog any worse. We couldn't say, couldn't talk
much about it. The black folks couldn't talk too much about it, you'd
be missin' and nobody know where you is.
Id. (quoting "Uncle AB, former Sharecropper").




46 BLACK ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTER, ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF
BLACK OWNED LAND IN THE RuRAL SouTH 19 (Robert S. Browne ed., 1973).
47 Loren Schweninger, Black Property Owners in the South 1790-1915, at 145 (1990).
48 DECLINE OF BLACK FARMING IN AMERICA, supra note 37, at 23.
49 Id. at 23-24.
So Id. at 24.
51 Id.
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legislation and the lure of higher wages in Northern factories also factored heavily
into post-Depression era African American land loss.52
The more recent figures on African American farm loss show a continued and
alarming rate of decline. Between 1978 and 1987, the number of African American-
owned farms declined by 23 percent, compared with a rate of 6.6 percent for white-
owned farms.5 3 In 1990, Congress found that African American-owned farms "were
going out of business at a rate three times that of white farms."'  The cycle of loss
was exacerbated by discriminatory lending practices by the Farmers' Home
Administration, lack of assistance from the USDA, and lack of access to the most
desirable farmland.55
African American farmers filed a class action lawsuit against the USDA in
1997, alleging "(1) that the [USDA] willfully discriminated against them and other
similarly situated African American farmers on the basis of their race when it denied
their applications for credit[,] . . . and (2) that ... the USDA failed properly to
investigate and resolve their complaints."' 6 Farm loans and other benefits available
to farmers from the USDA are administered by county commissioners - local
farmers elected to the commission by other local farmers.57 Not surprisingly, when
the lawsuit was filed, only 37 of the 8,148 county commissioners nationwide were
African American. 8
In 1999, the USDA and the plaintiffs in the class action suit entered into a
settlement in which each individual claimant could choose from three options to pur-
sue his claim.5 9 As of August 17, 2005, 13,997 African Americans had each been
52 Id. at 25-26.
s Phyliss Craig-Taylor, African American Farmers and the Fight for Survival: The
Continuing Examination for Insights Into the Historical Genesis of This Dilemma, 26 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 21, 23 (2003).
" Kristol Bradley Ginapp, Note, Jim "USDA " Crow: Symptomatic Discrimination in
Agriculture, 8 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 237, 243 (2003).
I1 d. at 243-44.
16 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 86 (D.D.C. 1999).
" Mitchell, supra note 22, at 528.
58 Id. "In 1994, minorities accounted for 4.7 percent of those eligible to vote for county
commissioner seats; however, just 2.9 percent of the county committee elected in 1994 were
minorities." Id. at 528 n.144.
" See Ginapp, supra note 54, at 245-46 (explaining the three options available for
claimants). The opt-out date for plaintiffs was March 21, 1999. Track A allows claimants
with "'substantial evidence' to recover $50,000 for credit discrimination or $3,000 for non-
credit discrimination. Id. at 245. As of August 17, 2005, 22,237 claims had been accepted
by the facilitator under Track A. USDA Office of Civil Rights, Pigford v. Veneman: Consent
Decree In Class Action Suit By African American Farmers, Statistics on Claims, at http://
www.usda.gov/cr/OCR/Pigford/status.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2005). The second option
available to claimants, Track B, provides "a settlement tailored to 'individual circum-
stances."' Ginapp, supra note 54 at 246. However, the track requires proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that the claimant has been a victim of discriminatory practices. Id.
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awarded either $50,000 or $3,000 (depending on which track they chose) as
restitution for discriminatory practices by the USDA. 60 Unfortunately, many of
those who filed successful claims had already lost their farms and gone through
bankruptcy as a result of their inability to receive fair treatment from the USDA.6'
According to Professor Thomas Mitchell:
Given the historic and stubborn refusal of these commissioners
to treat black farmers fairly, even after repeated federal studies
over the past decades documented blatant discrimination against
black farmers by USDA officials. . ., disparity in government
support for black farmers is likely to recur despite the settlement
of the Pigford lawsuit.62
Moreover, the settlement of the Pigford class action suit failed to move the USDA
to reform its lending practices or to take the power to determine loans out of the
hands of local commissioners.63
Only 181 claimants have been accepted by the facilitator under this track. USDA Office of
Civil Rights, supra note 59. Finally, claimants who choose not to accept Track A or Track
B can opt out and continue with individual claims. Ginapp, supra note 54 at 246.
60 USDA Office of Civil Rights, supra note 59. In 63 percent of the cases filed under
Track A, the farmer prevailed, resulting in a total of $686,300,000 paid out to African
American farmers against whom the USDA discriminated. Id. (last visited Aug. 30, 2005).
61 Ginapp, supra note 54, at 246-47 (discussing the feeling among the claimants that the
settlement itself is discriminatory).
The Black Farmers and Agriculturalists Association ("BFAA"), many
of whose members were part of [the] initial class in Pigford, think that
the consent decree should be thrown out because it has only had the
effect of ruining the lives of black farmers. BFFA [sic] claims that most
people who recover under the consent decree and receive the $50,000
payment no longer farm or own farmland, nor do they have any
outstanding loans with the USDA.
The few deserving black farmers who do get the settlement generally
must use the money to pay costs related to their previous bankruptcy. The
plain fact is that the settlement is "too little, too late." When these black
farmers were unable to secure financing from the USDA initially, they were
constructively forced to default on other loans and thus, forced off their
land. Black farmers have also lost their land in conjunction with the consent
decree when they have been denied the settlement and the USDA forecloses
on their land.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
62 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 528-29.
63 Id.
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II. TENANCY IN COMMON AND PARTITION STATUTES
A. Tenancy in Common
Tenancies in common created through intestacy laws differ from volitional
tenancies in common in important ways.64
A tenancy in common created consensually resembles a closely
held corporation: there tends to be a small number of co-owners,
each member of the ownership structure knows the other
owners, and the owners are likely to live within close proximity
of one another. A tenancy in common created under the laws of
intestacy, by contrast, bundles together groups of people who
may possess little actual connection to one another and perhaps
lack even knowledge of one another's identity.6 5
Under a tenancy in common created by intestacy laws, the number of interests
increases and their sizes vary as title passes through each successive generation of
lineal heirs. 6 Over time, the owners of individual interests are likely to move away
and spread out across the country.6 7
With heirs' property, the land often lacks record title.68 Moreover, it becomes
difficult for the interest holders living on the land to coordinate decisions regarding
the land because all the title holders value their interests differently.69 When these
values differ, conflicts arise.7" In Johnny Rivers's family, Johnny and his sister,
Blondell Wigfall, had a disagreement that resulted in her calling a lawyer who
located all the heirs and started the partition suit.7
B. Partition Sales
A partition is the division of the property among the title holders according to
the size of their interests.72 State statutes tend to provide that partition in kind is the
preferred remedy,73 permitting a judge to divide the land in kind according to the







"' Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle, supra note 1.
72 See Mitchell, supra note 22, at 513.
71 Id. at 513 & n.40 (citing every state's partition statute and noting that South Carolina's
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title.74 However, the number of heirs in many heirs' property disputes renders this
type of division impracticable since each heir would receive such a small allotment
of land as to render their interest valueless. In these situations, the court will most
often order a partition sale and division of the proceeds.75
The partition statutes that favor physical partition should be enforced as written.
A court should not order a partition sale merely because physical division of the
land is difficult. If the physical division is impossible because the division into such
small portions would render the land completely worthless, then a partition sale can
be ordered; however, such a sale should be held on the open market and not at an
auction where the land is sold below market value. Moreover, the burden should be
placed on the plaintiff to prove that such physical partition is impossible or that it
would render the land economically worthless. Currently, the burden is on the
defendant to prove that in-kind partition is both worthwhile and easily achieved."
If they are unable to succeed with either argument, courts usually order an auction.77
Such an auction is no better financially for the title holders than physical division
and sale would be and results in the loss of land even for those who would prefer to
remain. In Johnny Rivers's case, partitioning his family's land would have given
him approximately half of an acre on which to live.7" Such a lot is only slightly
larger than the subdivided mansion lots79 that resulted from the sale forced by the
judge. Further, the other Rivers family members who wished to sell should have
been allowed to do so on the open market where their tracts, even without the lots
statute does not provide a preference for in-kind division). South Carolina's statute, S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-61-10 (1977 & West Supp. 2005), states:
All joint tenants and tenants in common who hold ... an estate for a term
of life or years with the other that has an estate of inheritance or freehold in
any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be compellable to make
severance and partition of all such lands, tenements, and hereditaments.
Id.
74 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 513.
71 Casagrande, supra note 27, at 757 (noting that because African American cotenants
are often economically disadvantaged, they cannot afford to purchase their land back at
auction). "Furthermore, these partitioning sale actions are sometimes instigated by lawyers
to collect fees, and by judges who personally benefit by purchasing the properties." Id. The
author explains: "One probate judge who entered public service with almost no land
ownership now owns approximately 15,000 acres of land in a county that is 80 percent
black." Id. at n.27.
76 See id. (tracing the development of partition actions and arguing for a burden shift to
protect minority interests).
77 See, e.g., supra note 21 and accompanying text.
78 Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle, supra note 1.
7' Real estate flyer on file with author.
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retained by the Rivers family members who wished to stay, could have fetched close
to three times the amount the judge ordered them to accept.80
III. REGULATORY TAKINGS AND PUBLIC PURPOSE
A. The Fifth Amendment and Regulatory Takings
The Fifth Amendment provides that "private property [shall not] be taken for
public use, without just compensation.",8 ' This "eminent domain" principle gives
the government power to take private property for public use, providing that just
compensation is paid. 2 However, if the state merely regulates the property in
accordance with its police powers, no compensation need be paid even though the
owner's rights might be restricted or his property devalued as a result of the
regulation. 3
80 Bartelme, Heirs Land At Risk, supra note 5.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. V. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist in First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of L.A.,
As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently noted, this
provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead
places a condition on the exercise of that power. This basic
understanding of the [Fifth] Amendment makes clear that it is designed
not to limit the governmental interference with property rights per se,
but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper
interference amounting to a taking.
482 U.S. 304, 314-15 (1987) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
82 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (holding that although a city
must show a logical nexus for its exaction, it must also show that the permit conditions bear
a 'rough proportionality' to the negative impact of the development on the public); Lucas
v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that an exaction must be
logically related to the specific need if a regulation denies "all economically beneficial uses"
of land, it is a categorical taking unless the state can justify its actions as preventing a
common law nuisance); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (holding
that an exaction must be logically related to the specific public need to which the owner's
building contributes); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(holding that "the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-
backed expectations" must be considered by the court when determining whether to impose
economic loss on the landowner alone); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)
(stating "while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.").
83 Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). In order for a land use regulation to
avoid being a taking, the regulation must "substantially advance legitimate state interests"
and the regulation must not "den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land." Id. at
260.
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If a land use regulation imposes a burden on a relatively few landowners, it is
generally subject to a regulatory takings attack." "The basis of the concern for the
regulation's effect on a parcel's economic viability is the opinion that isolated
individuals should not have to bear the costs of community-wide social programs."85
Accordingly, government restrictions have been successfully challenged on the
ground that individual property owners are forced to bear the burden of programs
that are meant to benefit the public as a whole:
Where individual property owners are singled out to bear the
cost of advancing the public interest, considerations of justice
and fairness demand that these individuals not be forced to
contribute more than their proportionate share of the burden. In
effect, the Court has recognized a constitutional limitation to
compelling isolated individuals to privately subsidize desired
social programs, especially where the individuals have not
uniquely contributed to the social problem being addressed.
Considerable judicial opinion supports the well-established
proposition that the Fifth Amendment prevents the government
from "forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which,
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole. 86
B. Evolution of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence
The Court's decisions in the area of regulatory takings can be viewed on a
spectrum.87 At one end, traditional eminent domain actions are subject to "non-
controversial, straightforward rules requiring payment of just compensation. 8 At
the other end, a regulation that is promulgated for the public welfare is a valid police
power, and property owners who are affected by such a regulation receive no
compensation for the infringement on their rights:89
[O]nce a regulation crosses some invisible line such that it has
substantially the same impact on the property owner as a
physical confiscation, it ceases to be a valid police power action
84 Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a
New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297, 353 (1990).
85 Id. at 351.
86 Id. at 351-352 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 123) (citations omitted).
87 Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. Bus. L.J.
527, 530 (2000).
88 Id. at 530-31.
89 Id. at 531.
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and becomes instead a "regulatory taking." Although the
Supreme Court has never been able to articulate precisely where
the dividing line between valid police power actions and
regulatory takings lies, it is clear that the Court is willing to
tolerate extensive interference with property interests before a
regulatory taking will be found.9"
The Court has identified two categories of per se regulatory takings: those involving
a physical appropriation of land9' and regulations which destroy all economically
beneficial use of the property.92 However, most regulatory takings issues do not fall
into either category, and the Court has developed some tests to determine whether
a regulation should be categorized as a taking or as a valid use of the police power.93
Prior to 1922, the Takings Clause was limited to cases where the government
physically appropriated private property. However, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon,' the Court recognized that a regulation that substantially interferes "with
a property owner's rights is itself a compensable exercise of the eminent domain
power."95 For the first time, the Court set forth the difference between an invalid
taking and a valid exercise of the police power.96 The statute at issue had the effect
of rendering mineral rights virtually worthless because it placed such extreme
conditions on the mining of coal. 97 Justice Holmes wrote: "The general rule at least
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far
it will be recognized as a taking." '
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City was one of the first cases to
delineate how far the government can regulate before the statute becomes a taking. 99
In Penn Central, the Court held that New York City's Landmarks Preservation Law
did not constitute a taking of the plaintiff's property.l°" The Court articulated a three
part test to determine whether a regulation is a taking.' The Court considered "[t]he
90 Id
9' See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35 (1982)
(holding that a physical occupation of property is a taking "without regard to whether the
action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner").
92 See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992).
93 Oswald, supra note 86, at 532.
94 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
95 Oswald, supra note 86, at 530.
96 Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 418.
97 Id at 414-15.
98 Id. at 415.
99 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
'0o Id. at 138.
'0' Id. at 124.
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economic impact of the regulation on the claimant,"' 2 "the extent to which the
regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,"'0 3 and the
"character of the governmental action."'"
The majority held that so long as landmark preservation is carried out as part of
a comprehensive scheme, development of individual landmarks may be undertaken
without effecting an unconstitutional taking.0 5 The Court, in determining that a
taking had not occurred, reasoned that because New York City gave the owners
"transferable development rights" that they could use to increase the size of the
other buildings they owned, the economic impact on the owner of a landmark
building was too small to rise to the level of a taking.0 6 The effect of the holding
was that the government's regulation can be a taking if it severely affects private
property even if the government does not physically occupy the land.
Following Penn Central, the Court developed its regulatory takings jurispru-
dence further in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'0 7 in which the Court
found that when a regulation deprives a landowner of all economically viable use,
the landowner will benefit from a presumption that a taking has occurred.'0 8 The
Court further held that a regulation which substantially advances a legitimate state
interest will not be considered a taking.'0 9
The decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission10 and Dolan v. City
of Tigard.' further developed regulatory takings jurisprudence. Between the two
cases, the Court espoused the notion that there must be an "essential nexus""' 2 and
a "rough proportionality""' 3 between the purpose of the regulation and the regu-
lation itself. In determining the appropriate nexus between a physical exaction and
the governmental purpose, Justice Scalia wrote that the "'substantial advance[ment]'
of a legitimate state interest" is the standard by which the Court should test the




105 Id. at 138.
106 Id. at 137.
107 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
'0' Id. at 1015.
109 Id. at 1016.
"0 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
... 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
12 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
113 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
114 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841. See also Zygmunt J.B. Plater & William Lund Norine,
Through the Looking Glass ofEminent Domain: Exploring the "Arbitrary and Capricious"
Test and Substantive Rationality Review of Governmental Decisions, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.
L. REv. 661, 704 (1989).
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Nollan and Dolan demonstrate a harsher review by the Court of land use
regulations. With these two cases, the Court advanced a scheme whereby: (1) the
means chosen by the local government unit must "substantially advance" a legiti-
mate aim;' ' and (2) any yield required by an owner must be "roughly proportional"
to the harm caused by the new land use. 6 As the majority said in Dolan: "We see
no reason why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part of the
Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth Amendment, should be relegated
99II7to the status of a poor relation ....
C. Evolution of Public Purpose Jurisprudence
The Constitution places only two constraints on the ability of government
to take private property. The property must be taken for public use, and just
compensation must be paid."' "'Just compensation' requires only that the govern-
ment pay for the land that it takes, but the public use limitation is a substantive
constraint on the exercise of eminent domain.""..9 State courts have developed two
opposing views regarding the public use limitation. The first view argues that the
public use requirement is fulfilled simply when a benefit to the public results from
the taking. 2° The second view holds that "the public use requirement is satisfied
only when the public actually uses or retains the right to use the taken property."''
Although the second, narrower view was popular until the nineteenth century, the
broad view has always dominated. '22
1. Narrow View of Public Use Clause
The traditional view of public use meant that the land taken would be used for
the general public. The government could take property for itself, but it was not to
take land from A and give it to B. 2a This conservative approach meant that the land
must be used by and for the entire public. In Kohl v. United States,124 the Supreme
Court held that eminent domain "is a right belonging to a sovereignty to take private
115 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834.
16 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
7Id. at 392.
118 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
"1 Derek Werner, Note, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense, and Takings, 10 B.U.
PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 341-42 (2001) (footnote omitted).
120 Id. at 343.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 386, 388 (1798).
124 91 U.S. 367 (1875).
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property for its own public uses, and not for those of another."' 25 The narrow view
incorporated the belief that government's power to eminent domain should be limited
to certain specific circumstances.
2. Broad View of Public Purpose
In 1916, the Supreme Court decided Mt. Vernon- Woodberry Cotton Duck Co.
v. Alabama Interstate Power Co.,126 which allowed condemnation of land and water
rights so a power company could manufacture and sell hydroelectric power to the
public.'27 The Court's decision in this case began the "watering down" of the public
use requirement.28 In conferring a public benefit, the new use must only have a
value equal to or greater than the current use in order for a taking to be
permissible.'29 "Therefore, review is almost non-existent because '[s]ome portion
of the public will always benefit (just as others will lose) because of the resulting
changes in relative prices."1
30
The effect of "watering down" the Public Use Clause is that minorities are no
longer protected from majoritarian abuse.131 Instead, any majority who has captured
political power can easily take the land of "politically disfavored minorities,,' 32 and
legislatures can justify almost any arbitrary purpose as a public use, thus allowing the
majority to condemn the land of "the politically impotent to benefit the politically
influential."' 13
3
3. The Court's Shift to Public Purpose
In 1954, the Court used the broad view of the Public Use Clause to uphold the
constitutionality of the District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945.'34 The
Berman Court held that a city planning committee could condemn a shop in order
125 Id. at 373-74.
126 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
127 Id. at 33.
128 Peter J. Kulick, Comment, Rolling the Dice: Determining Public Use in Order to
Effectuate a "Public-Private Taking"-A Proposal to Redefine "Public Use, "2000L. REV.
MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 639, 647-48 (2000).
129 Werner, supra note 120, at 343.
130 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 170 (1985)).
131 Id. at 346.
132 Id.
133 Id.
'14 Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
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to combat urban blight.'35 The business owner claimed the plan was an unconstitu-
tional taking because he was not using his property for private uses but for public
ones, yet, under the plan, the site would be redeveloped for private, not public use.'36
The Court reasoned that the legislature, not the judiciary, should guard public need;
therefore, the Court played only a small role in determining whether eminent
domain was being exercised for a public purpose. 37 The Court stated in Berman:
We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its
outer limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts.
The definition is essentially the product of legislative determina-
tions addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither
abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition.
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legisla-
ture has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms
well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the
judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to served by
social legislation .... This principle admits of no exception
merely because the power of eminent domain is involved. The
role of the judiciary in determining whether that power is being
exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.t31
In 1984, the Supreme Court relied on Berman and held that the Public Use
Clause permitted the State of Hawaii to transfer real property from one private
owner to another. 39 The settlers of the Hawaiian Islands developed a feudal system
in which one high chief controlled land and assigned subchiefs to develop it.140 No
person owned land privately; as Hawaii was developed, however, Americans tried
to wrest control of the land from the chiefs.'4 ' The Americans were unsuccessful,
and ownership of land in Hawaii was concentrated among a very few landowners
who rented out parcels to individual families. 42 To redress the problem, the
' Id. at 35.
136 Id. at31.
13' Elizabeth A. Taylor, Note, The Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Power
of Eminent Domain, 36 B.C. L. REv. 1061, 1066 (1995).
138 Berman, 348 U.S. at 32.
139 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984).
140 Id. at 232.
141 Id.
142 Id. The problem was so pervasive that, "while the... governments owned almost 49%
of the State's land, another 47% was in the hands of only 72 private landowners.... The
legislature concluded that concentrated land ownership was responsible for skewing the
State's residential fee simple market, inflating land prices, and injuring the public tranquility
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government of Hawaii created a plan whereby the privately owned tracts were
condemned by the government, subdivided into small lots, and sold to the former
lessees of the land. 43 The lessor owners were paid fair market value for their land;
however, they sued the state claiming the plan was an unconstitutional taking.'"
The Court held that it "w[ould] not substitute its judgment... as to what constitutes
a public use 'unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.""' 145 With
this statement, the Court endorsed the broad view that it will not disturb a state's
determination that an act purports a public use. As long as the state could have a
rational public use in mind, the Court will uphold the state's action.'" After
concluding that the public purpose was a proper one, Justice O'Connor further
concluded that the Court could not "condemn as irrational the [Hawaii Land
Reform] Act's approach to correcting the land oligopoly problem."' 47 Despite the
Court's mandate that the judiciary engage in a constitutionally required rational
basis scrutiny of the legislature's stated purpose, the Court clearly deferred to the
legislature's decision to redistribute land from one private owner to another under the
public use doctrine. 4 Further, the Court's "combination of rational basis analysis
with the public-purpose inquiry is significant because it... was a fundamental part
and welfare." Id. (citations omitted).
4 Id. at 233.
14 Id. at 234 n.2, 234-35.
145 Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668, 680
(1896)).
' Justice O'Connor noted:
The mere fact that property taken outright by eminent domain is
transferred in the first instance to private beneficiaries does not
condemn that taking as having only a private purpose. The Court long
ago rejected any literal requirement that condemned property be put
into use for the general public. "It is not essential that the entire
community, nor even any considerable portion, .. . directly enjoy or
participate in any improvement in order [for it] to constitute a public
use."
Id. at 243-44 (alterations in original) (quoting Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700,707
(1923)).
14' Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 242. Justice O'Connor continued:
The Act presumes that when a sufficiently large number of persons
declare that they are willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices the
land market is malfunctioning. When such a malfunction is signalled,
the Act authorizes HHA to condemn lots in the relevant tract. The Act
limits the number of lots any one tenant can purchase and authorizes
HHA to use public funds to ensure that the market dilution goals will
be achieved. This is a comprehensive and rational approach to
identifying and correcting market failure.
Id.
148 Id. at 242-43.
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of the holding."'49 After Midkiff, federal courts were free to validate any regulation
so long as it conceivably could benefit the public. Berman and Midkiff "vest[ed]
state and federal authorities with almost unlimited power to condemn property
provided that the government pays just compensation, no matter whether the prop-
erty could be characterized as fungible or 'property for personhood.'""' 0
The judiciary's deference to legislative determinations of public use was
solidified in Kelo v. City of New London. ' The Supreme Court held that economic
development satisfies the Court's "traditionally broad understanding of public
purpose."' 2 The decision was surprising for several reasons, including the apparent
flip-flop of philosophies between the conservative and liberal justices on the Court.
The Court's liberal justices joined the majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens,
which stressed the ability of state and local governments to determine the proper use
of eminent domain.'53 The conservative justices, who generally raise federalism
concerns, wanted to constrain local legislative decisions with strict judicial interpreta-
tion of the public use requirement.'54 The decision is a pristine grant of condemnation
power to local governments because Kelo presented no social justifications such as the
clearance of slums in Berman or the equalization of land ownership in Midkiff.
The City of New London wished to exercise its eminent domain power over a
neighborhood in order to raze the houses and bring development to the economically
"'distressed municipality;"31" 55 however, unlike Berman, the residential property in
question was not blighted. Condemnation proceedings were initiated by the
planning committee against the neighborhood's homeowners who refused to sell.'56
Justice Stevens wrote that the plans came about as a response to the dire conditions
in the city and were the result of careful consideration by the planning committee. 5 1
As with all the other takings cases, the Court's determination turned on whether the
City's development plan served a public purpose. 5 ' Justice Stevens examined
Berman and Midkiff to conclude: "For more than a century, our public use
jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use
of the takings power."' 59
4 Plater & Norine, supra note 115, at 703.
0 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 552.
'5' 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
i52 Id. at 2665-66.
' Id. at 2665.
' Id. at 2672-73 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
155 Id. at 2658 (plurality opinion).
156 Id. at 2660
157 Id. at 2665.
15 8d. at 2663.
119 Id. at 2664.
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The majority opted not to adopt a bright line rule that economic development
is not a public use. Rather, Justice Stevens held that, although "the government's
pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual parties,' '.. ° "[b]y focusing
on a property's future use, as opposed to its past use, our cases are faithful to the text
of the Takings Clause."'' After Kelo, the government's ability to take private
property seems unconstrained, given that some public benefit could arise from
nearly any private transfer of ownership.
Justice Kennedy's concurrence emphasized specific facts in Kelo that may serve
as future guidance on how governments must constrain their eminent domain power,
and he was careful to consider the city's actual objective. He noted that the taking
was "in the context of a comprehensive development plan meant to address a serious
city-wide depression."' 62 He urged that when economic development is the purpose,
and private parties will benefit, the court must conduct careful enquiry into the facts
to determine whether the "'stated public purpose . . . is only incidental to the
benefits that will be confined on private parties of a development plan."" 63 Justice
Kennedy concluded that the precaution taken by the planning committee, the
anonymity of the benefitted parties, and the careful scrutiny by the trial court all
mandated that the committee's plan survive the rational scrutiny established by the
Court in Berman and Midkiff'"
Justice O'Connor wrote the dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas. She argued forcefully that the Court's decision renders
all private property "vulnerable to being taken and transferred to another private
owner, so long as it might be upgraded."' 65 Justice O'Connor urged that an "external
judicial check" is necessary to ensure that legislatures exercise their eminent domain
power appropriately' and that Berman and Midkiff exercised this judicial check
correctly because the takings in those cases were necessary to forestall the harms of
the existing property uses when the cases were brought.'67 The majority opinion,
according to the dissent, "wash[es] out" the distinction between private and public
use by lifting an "incidental public benefit" to the level of "public use" imagined by
the Founding Fathers.'68
Although the Kelo decision seems like a victory for developers rather than
homeowners, the decision strengthens the case for heirs' property title-holders.
160 Id. at 2666.
161 Id. at 2666 n.16.
162 Id. at 2670 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
163 Id. at 2669.
'6 Id. at 2670.
165 Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
166 Id. at 2673.
167 Id. at 2674-75.
168 Id. at 2671-72.
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Because the Court has determined that legislatures deserve "broad latitude"'69 when
taking action to create or preserve public use, any protective measures taken to
ensure that heirs' property is not forced into partition sale would withstand judicial
scrutiny.
4. Implications of Judicial Deference
Because the judiciary is now so deferential to the state's stated purpose in
Takings Clause cases, the Public Use Clause no longer protects minorities from
majoritarian abuse as the Founders intended. 7 °
Rather, the decline of public use doctrine has allowed majorities who
have captured power to take the land of politically disfavored
minorities. By deferring to legislative declarations of public use, the
judiciary has opened the door to the type of arbitrary government
that the Framers sought to prevent. Majorities with the power to
condemn property have happily stepped in, using their power to take
the land of the politically impotent to benefit the politically influen-
tial. 171
The Public Use Clause was intended to prohibit the majority from usurping
resources or redistributing opportunities from one group to another merely because
they possess the "raw political power to obtain what they want.''172 This struggle
between the rights of the majority and minority has been characterized as such:
"'Whereas majoritarian interference with protected rights constitutes a tyranny by
the majority, denial of the majority's power to rule in spheres not specifically
protected constitutes a tyranny by the minority."",173  The Public Use Clause
illustrates this dilemma. For example, without the Public Use Clause, a minority
landowner could attempt to thwart a public project by refusing to sell or by holding
onto his land unless offered a vastly higher price than others who sold before him.'
74
But for the government's eminent domain power, the result of this quandary would
permit individual landowners to thwart the will of the majority and effectively veto
proposed public projects. 175 "Eminent domain prevents the exercise of minority
169 Id. at 2664 (plurality opinion).
170 Werner, supra note 119, at 346.
'7 Id. (footnotes omitted).
172 Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLuM. L. REv. 1689,
1689 (1984).
171 Werner, supra note 119, at 347 (quoting David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing:
A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 88 N.W. U. L. REv. 641, 644 (1994)).
1'4 Id. at 347-48.
171 Id. at 348.
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vetoes by allowing legislative majorities to employ the coercive machinery of the
state to force the transfer of land from the dissenting minority to the public.' 76
The state's eminent domain power has grown too large, however, and its ability
to justify the exercise of that power through the Public Use Clause has gone
virtually unchecked by the Court. 77 Madison's fear of government officials'
propensity for despotism when power is accumulated by majority factions has been
realized.'78 The expectation that they will receive just compensation and the "lack
of access to the political system"'7 9 influence minorities to accept the condemnation
action. 18 They may be further discouraged from pursuing action when they realize
that "those seeking condemnations are special interest groups and repeat-players
with legislative clout. '181
Courts can ensure that municipalities do not favor rich over poor. Some courts
are beginning to recognize the need to ensure fair treatment and provide restitution
for past discrimination. Many courts now require municipalities "to accommodate
their share of the region's poor by building housing, subsidizing rents and requiring
builders to sell units at designated prices."' ' 82 In Southern Burlington County
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,'83 the New Jersey Supreme Court covered
new territory by invalidating portions of a zoning ordinance that excluded low and
moderate income housing from the municipality.' The judgment went on to strike
down the trial court's ruling that the town undertake "a plan of affirmative public
action designed 'to enable and encourage the satisfaction of the indicated needs' for
township-related low and moderate income housing."'' 5 The court noted, however,
that the municipality should undertake appropriate action and implied that it would
be willing to order further judicial action if the city did not comply. 86 In subsequent
litigation, the New Jersey court explained its ruling, stating: "The basis for the
constitutional obligation is simple: the State controls the use of land, all of the land.
In exercising that control it cannot favor rich over poor.'
87
176 Id.
177 Id. at 350.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 354.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American
Politics, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 817, 838 (1993).
183 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 734 (quoting 290 A.2d 465 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972)).
186 Id
187 S. Burlington Co. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,415 (N.J. 1983).
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Thus far, no other state courts have followed New Jersey's lead. Politicians
have questioned the court's holding in Mount Laurel as engaging in unauthorized
policymaking.'88
A study of the aftermath of the 1983 Mount Laurel II decision
concluded: "Perhaps the worst burden overhanging the Mount
Laurel process is the manner of its birth .... With the judicial
involvement came intense controversy,... which has discour-
aged politicians everywhere and judges outside of New Jersey
from embracing the approach."' 89
5. Takings and Economic Growth
In takings analysis, it is often assumed that increased employment and an
increased tax base will benefit the public.' 90 However, municipalities often cannot
provide services to meet the increasing demand. 9' The need for new housing,
schools, and other necessities can outstrip a city's economic resources. In terms of
taking heirs' property for economic growth, the externalities of development include
the loss of cultural identity and heritage. 92 The effects of these losses can be
devastating to a community.
Too frequently, courts fail to consider these human costs. 193 The current tenants
who are relocated can afford housing only comparable to or less desirable than what
they had before the displacement. " Further, the destruction of the community can
be even more devastating for a member of that community than the loss of his own
home:
Particularly among the poor, "the existence of a matrix of
mutually shared values and mutually shared concerns and
support are necessary conditions, not just to psychic wellbeing,
but to physical survival itself." While the prosperous can obtain
what they need to survive, the impoverished often look to "a
188 Coyle, supra note 183, at 838.
189 Id. at 838-39 (quoting Martha Lamar et al., Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable
Housing in New Jersey, 1983-1988,41 RUTGERS L. REv. 1197, 1277 (1989)).
190 Id.
91 Nancy K. Kubasek, Time to Return to a Higher Standard of Scrutiny in Defining
Public Use, 27 RUTGERS L. REc. 3, 14 (2003).
192 Id.
193 Keasha Broussard, Note, Social Consequences of Eminent Domain: Urban
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web of mutual support consisting of nonmonetary exchange of
goods and services with each individual contributing to the others
whatever meager abundance and special talents he might have."
By scattering the members of these communities, displacement
causes the dissolution of the bonds that they have formed.'95
Land ownership among African Americans is particularly important. Studies
have shown that land ownership in African American communities promotes
community well-being in the form of "increased civic participation, psychological
well-being, and an enhanced sense of community," and children who stay in school
longer.'96 "This focus on land as a base for community infrastructure extrapolates
from the classical liberal view that landownership is uniquely important to the
protection of individual liberty interests.' ' 97
Families often build communal relationships tied to the land. Just as Johnny
Rivers shared the land with his sisters, children, grandchildren, and great-grandchil-
dren, 9' many African American landowners have set up family communes where
family members of all generations rely on one another. 9 Although the benefits of
these connections are not economically tangible, they provide important cultural,
and societal benefits that are destroyed when ties are broken and the families are
forced to move.2" Further, for African Americans whose ties to the land go back
to slavery, owning land where their ancestors were once held in bondage can be
nearly sacred. As Phyllis Craig-Taylor explained:
Acquisition of the "homeplace" or productive land was the first
symbolic step toward true liberty or freedom for many African
Americans following Reconstruction. Individual property owner-
ship was viewed as a necessity for adaptation and citizenship.
The psychological and emotional significance of retaining a
'.. Id. at 111 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Denis J. Brion, The Meaning of the City: Urban
Redevelopment and the Loss of the Community, 25 IND. L. REv. 685, 702 (1991)).
196 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 539 (footnotes omitted).
197 Id.
98 Bartelme, Heirs Property Tangle, supra note 1.
199 Mitchell, supra note 22, at 539. In a study that compared equally poor, landowning and
landless elderly black people in the Piedmont region of North Carolina, researchers
determined "that a greater percentage of the children of sharecroppers moved far away from
their parents (often to northern cities) than did the children of landowners. Id. at 540
(footnotes omitted). The elderly sharecroppers were more often left to fend for themselves."
The study also found that two-thirds of landowners lived on family compounds composed
of several generations who "established 'reciprocal exchange relationships."' Id.
200 In the Rivers case, the family lived in seven trailers spread across the property. After
the eviction, the families were relocated to different areas, all in different neighborhoods.
Bartelme, Families Evicted, supra note 3.
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particular property is immeasurable in financial terms and may
"[do] violence" to the individuals whose cultural and historical
ties bind them so closely to the property.2°'
Thus, while preserving heirs' property may not yield the most profitable use of land,
the benefits to the community are incalculable.
IV. PROPOSED REFORMS
Takings jurisprudence has evolved from an initial wariness of the Public
Purpose Clause to an embrace of it as a legitimate exercise of the state's power.
Because the courts grant such deference to state condemnation proceedings, it is
likely that reform to protect heirs' property would also be upheld as a legitimate
exercise of the state's eminent domain power. These reforms could take several
different forms, but all of the proposed reforms would withstand rational scrutiny.
The first reform is to shift the burden onto the plaintiff in partition sales to prove
that in-kind partition is impossible. Most state statutes and common law favor
partition in kind. More often, however, courts now order a partition sale because the
physical division of land is impractical among so many cotenants. State legislatures,
for the most part, have not changed the partition statutes to reflect a newfound
preference for partition sales. As discussed in Part IIB, most state statutes require
a partition sale only when physical division is "impossible., 20 2 Nonetheless, courts
routinely construe "impossible" to mean "improbable" or "impractical. '20 3 "This
trend contradicts the language, purpose, and spirit of the statute .... In the absence
of compelling reasons, which have never been advanced by ... courts, express
statutory language prohibits the court's use of partitioning sales unless the parties
clearly prove the impossibility of division in kind. ' 21
Several factors account for the judiciary's preference for partition sales.
[T]he judicial system implicitly disfavors the co-ownership of land.
Furthermore, when faced with the practical difficulties of and the
efforts involved with partitioning generally, courts find it easier to
conduct a sale, rather than a partition by division in kind. Finally,.
. because partitioning sale actions involve considerably less effort
while generating greater legal fees than actions in which property is
divided in kind, lower income cotenants desiring to protect their
201 Phyliss Craig-Taylor, Through a ColoredLooking Glass: A View ofJudicialPartition,
Family LandLoss, andRule Setting, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 737, 774 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
202 See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
203 Casagrande, supra note 27, at 774-75 (footnotes omitted).
204 Id.
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interests frequently are unable to procure adequate legal represen-
tation." 5
Phyliss Craig-Taylor proposed three reforms that involve actual statutory
revision. The first of these reforms is to require a supermajority vote of the
cotenants in order for a court to order a partition sale.2°6 A second proposed reform
is a modification to existing statutes to include a redemption period, "where the
family interest holders could gather the funds to redeem the property."2 °7 Craig-
Taylor's third idea is "to ensure that cotenants acquire a license in the developed
property that forces the developer to share its profits."2 8 The supermajority vote
would protect the interests of disadvantaged titleholders from developers with deep
pockets.2°9 Further, it would encourage the family to work together, possibly
through arbitration, and would allow "the court to avoid the complicated technical
analysis required to divide land by partition in-kind, while still preserving the
common law presumption favoring actual partition."2 0  Most importantly, a
supermajority vote would be a "powerful disincentive" for the type of financial
speculation that played out in the Rivers case."' Craig-Taylor observes: "Courts
have consistently noted the longstanding policy favoring preservation of a right to
inheritance. The market interests advanced by developer speculation are not
sufficient to outweigh the strong social value of preserving inherited interests,
205 Id. at 783.
206 Craig-Taylor, supra note 201, at 780.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 781. Craig-Taylor notes:
In considering these alternative methods of honoring the family interest
holder's investment in commonly held property, one must be mindful
that compulsory partition is an action in equity, created in order to
avoid the further headaches that arise from common ownership of
property. However, the case of the outside interest holder does not
present the same considerations as the case where cotenants have
experienced a change of circumstance and are no longer practically
able to enjoy common ownership. The developer who purchases a
fractional interest in commonly held property obviously never intended
to enjoy common ownership with the family. To the contrary, the
developer had every intention, when it acquired the interest, to destroy
the cotenancy in order to force a sale and purchase of the land. Thus,
any right to equitable relief should be limited where the outside interest
holder "attempts to discard the headaches that accompany the common
ownership" that was voluntarily assumed for speculative purposes.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
209 Id at 781-82.
210 Id. at 782.
211 Id.
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particularly in communities where such ownership is directly tied to community
identity." '212
Craig-Taylor does not address the interests of developers or titleholders who
would prefer a partition sale over partition in kind. A supermajority vote would
restrict the right of these owners to sell and represents governmental intrusion into
private land use. Under these proposed statutory revisions, the cotenant who wished
to sell against the supermajority vote of the other cotenants might bring a cause of
action against the government for a regulatory taking. As discussed earlier in this
Note, however, the need to preserve African American heirs' property, particularly
that which has been passed intestate since Reconstruction, is a valid public need, and
would likely withstand rational scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The struggle of African American farmers has been ignored for far too long.
The Pigford class action has failed to spur the USDA to revise its policies, and the
loan applications of the remaining African American farmers are still in the hands
of white farmers, elected by other local farmers, who are not accountable to anyone.
Tens of thousands of farmers have been discriminated against by the federal
government in trying to obtain farm loans, unknown numbers of families are
struggling to preserve a dying heritage, and millions of acres have already been lost.
Even those families who fight developers in court are forced to sell their land
at auction where they receive much less than they would on the open market. The
system is vastly unfair, and courts exacerbate the unfairness by continuing to order
partition sales even when physical division of the land is possible. Enforcing the
statutes as written might stem the flood of land loss; however, rewriting the statutes
to save this cultural heritage would offer more protection.
Such revisions will face takings challenges, but with the legislature in favor of
land preservation, those challenges could not withstand rational scrutiny. For many
African Americans, property ownership is a symbol of freedom and provides
psychological security. Thus far, the government has made no significant effort to
halt this land loss. To redress the effects of discrimination on African American
farmers, the government must make special efforts to protect minority-owned land.
2 Id. at 782 (footnote omitted).
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